System updated with slight liberalisation of the authorities’ monopoly on communication with the population
In 2016, amid oscillating popular ratings of the state and public institutions, the Belarusian society demonstrated high adaptability and reduced its requirements on the state. Social tension caused by the decline in the people's wellbeing and cutbacks in the state social guarantees, neither transformed into open protests and enhanced support for the opposition, nor boosted electoral activity. Spontaneous and localised protests by regional entrepreneurs were the only exception, but the authorities had successfully neutralised them by the spring, i.e. by the time the opposition normally woke up.
Some business organisations attempted to unite SMEs and channel the protests into a constructive stream without the street protests, which was the main negotiation requirement by the authorities. Entrepreneurs attempted to distance themselves from the opposition and did not politicise their demands, which, however, became stronger as the authorities refused to address them. Nevertheless, the Belarusian authorities managed to mute protests by making small concessions, relaxing power pressure, involving local administration in the negotiations with the protesters and delaying the conflict resolution.
In relations with the opposition and civil society, the authorities abandoned harsh repressions and focused on the financial pressure, legal restrictions and economic discrimination. Despite some political liberalisation, the Belarusian authorities pre-emptively expanded the legal framework for repressions in the case of social unrest and "hybrid" threats. In addition, new faces emerged in the protest movement from high-profile cases and prosecution of active citizens not connected with the titular opposition.
The government became more open to contacts with opposition representatives in order to improve its reputation internationally and divert protest sentiments. The Belarusian authorities somewhat increased the opportunities for the opposition to communicate with the population by allowing some limited access to the state TV and the print media.
During the parliamentary elections, the authorities increased the opportunities for the opposition to hold campaign events, but retained full control over the election process and the election results. The authorities made minor concessions to the opposition during the election race, (yet not at the legislative level) in order to create a favourable environment for the normalisation of relations with Western capitals.
Apparently, thanks to the joint pressure from Western capitals and the opposition with a constructive agenda, the Belarusian leadership granted two seats in the Parliament to the opposition.
Amid plans to reduce the state apparatus, anti-corruption pressure and unattainable economic growth plans, the nomenclature stepped up the competition for seats in the new parliament to "wait out" a crisis in a more comfortable "parliamentary" environment. The fact that the competition within the state apparatus became visible meant there was a certain imbalance in the public administration system.
In addition, the authorities milked some businessmen proxies, who built their wealth by being close to the authorities and public resources (eg Case of Yuri Chizh). Security officers were often used as a final argument in the struggle for the resource redistribution; they firmly anchored in Lukashenka’s environment, while large private businesses somewhat lost their influence and political representation in the Parliament.
The government attempted to limit pro-Russian activity in Belarus and allowed ‘soft belarusisation’. That said, the authorities adopted some opposition's popular slogans, symbols and ideas promoting independent Belarus.
Amid lingering socio-economic crisis, expectations of a steady decline in public institutions’ popular ratings prompted the authorities to take a final decision on ‘killing off’ independent sociology: the only independent sociological agency in Belarus, conducting regular polls on social, economic and political issues, IISEPS, ceased its activity entirely.
The All-Belarusian People's Assembly demonstrated that the authorities lacked new ideas and strategies for driving Belarus out of economic recession; that the Belarusian leadership was committed to the state monopoly in the economy and immutability of the political system, while gradually waving social responsibility.
President Lukashenka continues to rotate staff and rejuvenate heads of departments and universities following new appointments in regional administrations. Apparently, new Information Minister Karliukevich could somewhat relax the state policy towards the independent media and introduce technological solutions for retaining control over Belarus’ information space. New rectors could strengthen the trend for soft Belarusization in the regions and tighten the disciplinary and ideological control over the student movement in the capital.
President Lukashenka has appointed new ministers of culture and information, the new rector of the Belarusian State University and heads of three universities, assistants in the Minsk and Vitebsk regions.
The new Information Minister Karliukevich is likely to avoid controversial initiatives similar to those former Minister Ananich was famous for, however, certainly within his capacities. Nevertheless, the appointment of Belarusian-speaking writer Karliukevich could be regarded as the state’s cautious attempt to relax environment in the media field and ensure the sovereignty of national media.
The Belarusian leadership has consolidated the trend for mild Belarusization by appointing a young historian and a ‘reasonable nationalist’, Duk as the rector at the Kuleshov State University in Mogilev. Meanwhile, while choosing the head of the Belarusian State University, the president apparently had in mind the strengthening of the ideological loyalty among the teaching staff and students at the main university in order to keep the youth movement at bay. Previously, Korol was the rector of the Kupala State University in Grodno, where he held purges among the disloyal teaching staff.
The trend for the renewal of mid-ranking executives and their rejuvenation has confirmed. The age of the Culture Minister and three new rectors varies from 39 to 44 years old.