Minsk ponders early presidential elections
Belarus’ crumbling socio-economic situation means that a call for an early presidential election is among the likely scenarios. The decision about the election date will depend on whether Minsk manages to lobby its interests in the Kremlin. Any time soon, President Lukashenko anticipates receiving Moscow’s guarantees of support for the Belarusian economy before the 2015 presidential campaign.
Amid spiralling problems in the Belarusian economy, political analysts have started talking about early presidential elections.
The next presidential election in Belarus should be held by November 20th, 2015, at the latest. As Belarusian legislation does not regulate early elections, the Belarusian authorities may call for an early presidential campaign. In 2006, for example, the presidential elections could have taken place in June, but were held in March – three months before the deadline.
The Belarusian authorities have full control over all the mechanisms necessary to ensure the election results. During the 2014 local elections, electoral commissions demonstrated complete loyalty and ensured the turnout requested by the authorities.
Usually during a presidential campaign, the Belarusian authorities seek to increase presidential approval ratings by raising wages. Despite some recovery in Q1 2014, economic imbalances are growing, and require adjustments, which imply lower incomes. The authorities aspire for additional external financing in order to avoid a major crisis. Today, such assistance may only come from Russia.
However, the Kremlin is not yet ready to pay for Belarus’ entry into the EEC on her own terms. During the Minsk Summit, President Lukashenko failed to reap major concessions from Russia as regards oil duty exemptions, which would imply an additional income of USD 3-4 bln per year. Nevertheless, the Kremlin made some concessions to Minsk, for example, it agreed to supply 2 mln tons of oil to Belarusian refineries in 2014 and to issue a USD 2 bn loan.
External factors seem to favour Belarus’ government. Belarus expects that events in Ukraine will prompt the EU and the USA to revise their attitude towards Belarusian leadership. If President Lukashenko manages to preserve a balanced position in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, he may increase his role in the region as a mediator and induce the EU to soften its stance.
Events in Ukraine have also contributed to strengthening Lukashenko’s rating at home. More and more, Belarusian society favours a strong state which is capable of ensuring political stability in the country. In addition, Belarusian propaganda can always provide updates on the Euromaidan’s negative aspects.
As the Kremlin is focused on promoting its interests in Ukraine, the Belarusian authorities expect less attention from Moscow to internal political processes in Belarus. For example, during the last presidential election campaign in 2010 President Lukashenko’s relations with the Kremlin deteriorated sharply. And being under strong pressure from Moscow, President Alexander Lukashenko was forced to sign documents to establish the Common Economic Space. In the long-term, Belarus’ total dependence on the Kremlin will mean that the costs of post-Soviet integration for Belarus will only rise. .
Therefore, holding early elections in Belarus does not appear to be the main scenario for the Belarusian authorities. President Lukashenko counts on the Kremlin to provide some kind of support for the Belarusian economy for the election period.
The Belarusian authorities regard the Catholic conference as yet another international event to promote Minsk as a global negotiating platform. Minsk’s proposal to organise a meeting between the Roman-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church is rather an image-making undertaking than a serious intention. However, the authorities could somewhat extend the opportunities for the Roman-Catholic Church in Belarus due to developing contacts with the Catholic world.
Minsk is attempting to lay out a mosaic from various international religious, political and sportive events to shape a positive image of Belarus for promoting the Helsinki 2.0 idea.
Belarus’ invitation to the head of the Holy See for a meeting with the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church should be regarded as a continuation of her foreign policy efforts in shaping Minsk’s peacekeeping image and enhancing Belarus’ international weight. The Belarusian authorities are aware that their initiative is unlikely to find supporters among the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. In Russia, isolationist sentiments prevail.
In addition, for domestic audiences, the authorities make up for the lack of tangible economic growth with demonstrations of growth in Minsk’s authority at international level through providing a platform for religious, sportive and other dialogues.