Main results of 2012: The political elite remain in the President’s shadow
During the year, the most notable trends in Belarusian politics were the relative influence enhancement of the Administration of President and Alexander Lukashenko personally against decrease in his electoral rating; a weakening ability to influence the situation of other internal political players; a transition to "manual" management methods; an unsettled crisis in the relations with the EU and the U.S. The key challenges for the governing group in the coming years will include decrease of the state controllability, decline in living standards and securing electoral support in the presidential elections of 2015. The development of the situation shows that President Lukashenko will have to more often resort to extreme management methods for the retention of power.
Enhancing the Role of the President: Causes and Consequences
The year gone proved President Lukashenko remained the most influential figure in Belarus. A number of regulations adopted in the sphere of property relations significantly enhance the influence of the Presidential Administration, which decided to reconsider previously settled deals with the state property. The case of partial nationalization at "Kommunarka" and "Spartacus" enterprises in October means that any privatized enterprise may basically go back under the state control either by means of additional issue of shares, or through the introduction of a state representative to the Supervisory Board. Due to the restricted alternatives to manage economic processes and from propagandist considerations such actions are possible in 2013, as well.
At the same time the electoral rating of Lukashenko does not respond any more to the mobilization measures taken by the government, such as salary increase and strident rhetoric of the President addressed to his subordinates. Independent surveys show that Lukashenko’s electoral rating is set at 30%.
For the first time in the history of independent Belarus Alexander Lukashenko remained the president of the minority throughout the year. However, the popularity of the opposition has not increased. According to the sociologists, the majority of the Belarusian society agrees neither with the government policy nor the proposals of the opposition. The preconditions for accumulation of the discontented majority’s interests have been created but for now, no political force has taken advantage of the existing opportunities.
More frequent use of "manual" management methods - such as decrees and orders of the President or urgent Lukashenko’s visits to enterprises – has been a forced answer of the governing group to the overall decrease in the state governability. The latter became apparent, for example, in the failure of the budget modernization program of the woodworking industry. Another good example is unstopped illegal flight of a single –engine plane from Lithuania to Minsk and back, which revealed dangerous vulnerability of the entire system of national security. In both cases, the President’s reaction was the same: he discovered and dismissed the guilty, and/or issued a corresponding decree without eliminating the causes of the problem.
The emergence of various "state" rumors and information leaks such as issuance of 650,000 working visas to Chinese citizens, on the dispensation Lukashenko rebuke to Prime Minister Myasnikovich, the emergence of the territory of Belarus Russian air base, about the transplant Lukashenko to "Maybach"and so on. The appearance of such rumors is an inevitable opposite effect of ironfisted methods of "manual" presidential governance. Finally, the government’s intentions, presented by Vice Prime Minister Tozik, to strengthen the fight against parasitism and dependency or introduce compulsory declaration of income for all citizens, indicate the inability of the state to fulfill its social obligations to the former extent. If implemented, these measures will have an inverted effect in the form of general decrease in the living standards of citizens due to narrowing the sector of informal employment and reduction of informal income.
The political elite in the shade of President Lukashenko
Throughout the year, the governing elite in Belarus showed two significant trends reducing quite unlikely probability of the power succession scenario. Firstly, the influence of Prime Minister Myasnikovich has significantly reduced, which results in consequent weakening of his team with the knowledge of the President. During the year, two Deputy Prime Ministers close to Myasnikovich were removed from the government to other posts: V. Ivanov and S. Rumas. In addition, President Lukashenko has put freeze implementation of the privatization plan in cooperation with the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund, sponsored by Myasnikovich. Secondly, an important outcome of the year is dispelling of a popular myth about Viktor Lukashenko as a likely successor to his father as the head of the state. Notorious dismissals of some of the executive officers at the State Border Committee, and especially at KGB (in connection with the suicide of an officer) have significantly weakened the demonical image of Viktor Lukashenko as a shadow supervisor of the Belarusian security services and have shown that the eldest son of the President, at best, can lobby for appointment of executive officers at certain law enforcement agencies, but does not control their work.
The most important result of the internal policy is putting freeze the issue of transition from the current majoritarian electoral system to a mixed or proportional one. Lukashenko’s refusal to implement electoral reform has blocked the political development of the largest and most influential in Belarus non-governmental organization "Belaya Rus", which may adversely affect future campaigns. In particular, the parliamentary elections have discovered fundamental divergence of interests of the presidential administration and elite of functionaries presented at "BR". When Lukashenko is interested to ensure high voting turnout and preserve the majority voted system, the elite of functionaries at "BR" is interested in the opposite. Low voting turnout at the last elections means that "BR" has not sufficiently engaged their on the spot mobilization resource, and this can be regarded as an "Italian strike". President Lukashenko will have one way or another to solve the problem of blocking the political future of "BR". For example, to allow establishment of a parliamentary group at the parliament, where "BR" will be in majority*, or vice versa - to stop the development of this organization, which already has more than 130 thousand members. Otherwise, the problem of low voting turnout might happen again at the presidential election in 2015. The independent research measurements suggest that it is the problem of voting turnout, and, in particular, the electoral support of the President, that will be the main challenge for the governing group in 2015.
Centrifugal tendencies have formed among Belarusian opposition that became apparent as far back as during the "parade of candidates" at the presidential election in 2010. Last year, various opposition forces have failed to agree on a common action plan and implemented 4 independent tactics of participation at the parliamentary elections. The scale of mutual distrust of the opposition forces is proved by the fact that three of these tactics were different forms of boycott, but their creators, nevertheless, acted separately. If centrifugal tendencies and distrust are preserved, the likelihood of the project "One candidate" at the presidential election in 2015 will be reduced to values close to zero. The chances to create a unique coalition by 2015 are reduced also due to the rift in the political emigration, where 2 centers are being formed around BNR Rada and Charter’97 and/or ex-presidential candidate A. Sannikov, who was granted a political asylum in London.
* It is reported that on December 20 there was a parliamentary group "Initiative" established at the House of Representatives. The group is under the supervision of the delegate from Stolbtsy parliamentary division, N. Ivanchenko (the Presidential Advisor - Chief Inspector for Minsk Region). It is most likely that this group will play the role of the center of policy initiatives in the parliament controlled by the President.
Over the past year, military-political relations between Minsk and Kyiv have become complicated. Due to their high inertia and peculiarities, this downward trend would be extremely difficult to overcome.
The root cause of the crisis is the absence of a common political agenda in the Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. Minsk is looking for a market for Belarusian exports in Ukraine and offers its services as a negotiation platform for the settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian war, thereby hoping to avoid political issues in the dialogue with Kiev. Meanwhile, Ukraine is hoping for political support from Minsk in the confrontation with Moscow. In addition, Ukraine’s integration with NATO presupposes her common position with the Alliance in relation to Belarus. The NATO leadership regards the Belarusian Armed Forces as an integral part of the Russian military machine in the western strategic front (the Baltic states and Poland). In addition, the ongoing military reform in Ukraine envisages a reduction in the number of generals and the domestic political struggle makes some Ukrainian top military leaders targets in politically motivated attacks.
Hence, the criticism of Belarus coming from Ukrainian military leadership is dictated primarily by internal and external political considerations, as well as by the need to protect the interests of generals, and only then by facts.
For instance, initially, the Ukrainian military leadership made statements about 100,000 Russian servicemen allegedly taking part in the Russo-Belarusian military drill West-2017. Then the exercises were labelled quazi-open and military observers from Ukraine refused to provide their assessment, which caused a negative reaction in Minsk. Further, without citing specific facts, it was stated that Russia was building up its military presence in Belarus.
Apparently, the Belarusian and Ukrainian Defence Ministries have entangled in a confrontational spiral (on the level of rhetoric). Moreover, only a small part of the overly hidden process has been disclosed. That said, third states are very likely to take advantage of the situation (or have already done so). This is not only about Russia.
The Belarusian Defence Ministry officials are restrained in assessing their Ukrainian counterparts. However, such a restraint is not enough. Current military-political relations between Belarus and Ukraine are unlikely to stabilise without the intervention of both presidents.