Lukashenko divides spheres of influence between the security forces
After the reform of law enforcement agencies in 2011, President Lukashenko redefines the limits of liability and the effect of various law enforcement agencies. The KGB will retain the right to control the political situation, and will be admitted to the promising economic projects such as building the nuclear power plant and customs control at CES.
President Lukashenko met with the leadership and staff of the State Security Committee on February 14.
After the creation of the Investigative Committee of Belarus in 2012, the powers of the KGB in conducting investigative activities were substantially limited. The domestic impact of this body needs to be overridden, which happened at the board and after it during the press briefing of the Committee representatives.
The KGB has got an informal sanction of the President to the supervision of investment projects, such as the construction of nuclear power plant and control over the movement of goods within the Common Economic Space. Both projects are particularly capital intensive, and therefore important for the Belarusian elites.
Lukashenko gave KGB the sanction to monitor the progress of the parliamentary campaign in 2012. In practical terms this will most likely mean gaining control over the rank and file participants in the process of the KGB (the polling station commission, the executive committees, etc.). Mobilization campaign is also possible - opening the machinations of an external enemy, which is financing a \"fifth column\".
Recall that during the election campaign it is supposed to replace the existing ¾ of Parliament, and the loyalty of government employees (which include teachers - the main participants of election commissions, as well as the line police officers) is somewhat undermined by lower returns (incomes).
The probability of “residency” disclosure of foreign intelligence services during the election campaign is confirmed by the results of panel coverage in the press - parliamentary elections are firmly linked with the increased external threat in the words of the President and the press service of the KGB. We also recall that amendments to the legislation, imposing administrative, and in case of a second violation criminal penalties for receiving funds from foreign citizens or states, were adopted in 2011.
The Belarusian authorities regard the Catholic conference as yet another international event to promote Minsk as a global negotiating platform. Minsk’s proposal to organise a meeting between the Roman-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church is rather an image-making undertaking than a serious intention. However, the authorities could somewhat extend the opportunities for the Roman-Catholic Church in Belarus due to developing contacts with the Catholic world.
Minsk is attempting to lay out a mosaic from various international religious, political and sportive events to shape a positive image of Belarus for promoting the Helsinki 2.0 idea.
Belarus’ invitation to the head of the Holy See for a meeting with the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church should be regarded as a continuation of her foreign policy efforts in shaping Minsk’s peacekeeping image and enhancing Belarus’ international weight. The Belarusian authorities are aware that their initiative is unlikely to find supporters among the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. In Russia, isolationist sentiments prevail.
In addition, for domestic audiences, the authorities make up for the lack of tangible economic growth with demonstrations of growth in Minsk’s authority at international level through providing a platform for religious, sportive and other dialogues.