Authorities crumb privatization deals in petrochemical industry
In early July, "Belneftekhim" Head Igor Zhilin was released from office. Until now, official explanation was not provided. In addition, the Belarusian law enforcement agencies do not comment the information, published in some independent media about the alleged arrest of Zhilin.
For example, according to BelaPAN, the General Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings under Article 424 of the Criminal Code (abuse of power or of a position of authority). A Russian citizen, Igor Zhilin in 2009 – amid dairy and "gas wars" between Moscow and Minsk and before the abolition of oil preferences – was appointed as ‘Grodno Nitrogen’ Head. In 2011 – amid a dispute over duty-free Russian oil – he was appointed as "Belneftekhim" Head. Experts have interpreted his most recent appointment as a preparation stage for privatisation of Belarus’ petrochemical industry by large Russian business. Today the Belarusian leadership is lacking sufficient resources to continue delaying privatisation in favour of Russian business. However, they might use some old means (eg Baumgertner case) to initiate tension in Russo-Belarusian relations, and put in jail top managers representing Russian oligarchs, interested in Belarusian assets.
Over the past year, military-political relations between Minsk and Kyiv have become complicated. Due to their high inertia and peculiarities, this downward trend would be extremely difficult to overcome.
The root cause of the crisis is the absence of a common political agenda in the Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. Minsk is looking for a market for Belarusian exports in Ukraine and offers its services as a negotiation platform for the settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian war, thereby hoping to avoid political issues in the dialogue with Kiev. Meanwhile, Ukraine is hoping for political support from Minsk in the confrontation with Moscow. In addition, Ukraine’s integration with NATO presupposes her common position with the Alliance in relation to Belarus. The NATO leadership regards the Belarusian Armed Forces as an integral part of the Russian military machine in the western strategic front (the Baltic states and Poland). In addition, the ongoing military reform in Ukraine envisages a reduction in the number of generals and the domestic political struggle makes some Ukrainian top military leaders targets in politically motivated attacks.
Hence, the criticism of Belarus coming from Ukrainian military leadership is dictated primarily by internal and external political considerations, as well as by the need to protect the interests of generals, and only then by facts.
For instance, initially, the Ukrainian military leadership made statements about 100,000 Russian servicemen allegedly taking part in the Russo-Belarusian military drill West-2017. Then the exercises were labelled quazi-open and military observers from Ukraine refused to provide their assessment, which caused a negative reaction in Minsk. Further, without citing specific facts, it was stated that Russia was building up its military presence in Belarus.
Apparently, the Belarusian and Ukrainian Defence Ministries have entangled in a confrontational spiral (on the level of rhetoric). Moreover, only a small part of the overly hidden process has been disclosed. That said, third states are very likely to take advantage of the situation (or have already done so). This is not only about Russia.
The Belarusian Defence Ministry officials are restrained in assessing their Ukrainian counterparts. However, such a restraint is not enough. Current military-political relations between Belarus and Ukraine are unlikely to stabilise without the intervention of both presidents.