Minsk will not engage in conflicts in Post-Soviet space
The escalation in Karabakh has once again raised issues of the CSTO capacity, Belarus’ involvement in the conflicts in the Post-Soviet space and her priorities in the South Caucasus. Belarusian policy in the South Caucasus is determined by financial and economic interests and not by commitments within post-Soviet associations. Minsk has neither recognised the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, nor introduced a visa regime with Georgia. Belarus has consistently supported peaceful reintegration of Karabakh with Azerbaijan. Then again, she would side with the non-peaceful one too.
The escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijani has somewhat revived Minsk’s political activity, as it seeks to consolidate its ‘peacemaker’ status in the post-Soviet space. Moreover, Azerbaijan is Belarus’ partner number one in the South Caucasus. In addition, the Belarusian authorities are interested in developing comprehensive cooperation with Turkey, Baku’s ally.
Alexander Lukashenka and Ilham Aliyev are close friends. Baku has repeatedly acted as a safety-cushion for Minsk by providing urgent loans worth hundreds of millions of dollars to help Belarus to maintain her financial stability.
Minsk’s pro-Azerbaijani position therefore is natural. And the fact that Armenia is the CSTO member, makes Belarus’ position most diplomatic. And there are no reasons for this to change in the future.
Armenia does not recognise the independence of Karabakh, and is not formally a party to the incident escalation as its territory is not subject to aggression. In its current form, the conflict does not affect any commitments of Belarus within the CSTO framework.
It is worth noting that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was created for quite pragmatic reasons: to train staff and maintain equipment and defence systems left over from the Soviet Union. Initially, the CSTO did not have any ideological or value-based framework. Russia’s subsequent attempts to transform the CSTO into a NATO analogue came to nothing.
The cooperation within the CSTO splits into two "dimensions":
- Practical matters (military-technical, education, communication, defence industry, etc.)
- Regional defence alliances (Eastern European, Caucasian and Central Asian)
That said, only Russia has vital interests in all three regions. Other CSTO regions are "linked" together through Moscow.
The CSTO member states have committed to assist each other in case of aggression against one of them. However, potential assistance is not limited to military measures and includes a range of responses: political, diplomatic, informational, logistical, financial, etc. In addition, all decisions within the CSTO require a consensus.
The CSTO does not envisage a mechanism, which could prompt Belarus to enter the war in the Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian regions. None of the CSTO member states is eager to fight for other CSTO members. Russia’s attempts to set CSTO against NATO have failed due to the efforts of the "junior partners": Moscow is simply unable to cope with all its allies at once.
The state programme for the development and maintenance of highways for 2017-2020 estimates preliminary costs at USD 2.8 billion; it envisages expansion of the toll network. Despite the planned increase in the proceeds from individuals for admission of vehicles to traffic and the overall increase in revenues of the republican road fund by 27% by 2020 (to BYN 674 million), the state’s annual subsidies for the Republican Road Fund deficit would be at least USD 50 million.