Kremlin started information campaign to sow seeds of strife between Minsk and Kiev
The Kremlin has stepped up the information and political-economic pressure on the Belarusian authorities. So far, the Belarusian authorities have not thought about replacing aggressive Russian content in the Belarusian media with domestic products. The Kremlin is attempting to create difficulties for Minsk and Kyiv (and Western capitals), and devalue Belarus’ foothold as an international negotiation platform.
The Russian First Channel aired ‘Time will tell’ last week, a talk show, which discussed the influence of history on relations between Belarus and Ukraine on the one side and Russia on the other.
The Kremlin has stepped up pressure on Minsk in the information space, international and trade relations. After freezing the oil and gas dispute, Moscow started insisting that Belarus gave in some of her sovereignty and agreed to a common visa space.
The information pressure could imply that the Kremlin is against strengthening international position of Minsk. Meanwhile, the Belarusian authorities are attempting to revive the negotiating platform over Ukraine and step up their status of a peacekeeper. Ukrainian media were alarmed by the news in the Russian and Belarusian media about the Russian Defence Ministry plans to increase cargo transportation through Belarus by 2017. Analysts pointed to this fact as a possible strengthening of the Russian military presence in Belarus. In addition, the Russian Defence Ministry’s media are attempting to build tension between Minsk and Kiev by talking about possible provocations against the Belarusian authorities from Ukraine.
Perhaps, the Russian media have stepped up criticism of the Belarusian authorities in response to the press tour for the Russian regional media organised by Belarus. Minsk used the press tour to influence public opinion in Russia and ensure a positive attitude towards the Belarusian government. Such an initiative could have been zealously interpreted in the Kremlin amid lingering tension over oil and gas in the Belarusian-Russian relations. By drawing parallels between Belarus and events in Ukraine, Russian propagandists aim to neutralize rosy perceptions of Belarus by inhabitants of the Russian province.
Nevertheless, in the case of a full-scale information war, Minsk could start censoring media content from Russia and switch on Internet filters.
The Belarusian authorities regard the Catholic conference as yet another international event to promote Minsk as a global negotiating platform. Minsk’s proposal to organise a meeting between the Roman-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church is rather an image-making undertaking than a serious intention. However, the authorities could somewhat extend the opportunities for the Roman-Catholic Church in Belarus due to developing contacts with the Catholic world.
Minsk is attempting to lay out a mosaic from various international religious, political and sportive events to shape a positive image of Belarus for promoting the Helsinki 2.0 idea.
Belarus’ invitation to the head of the Holy See for a meeting with the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church should be regarded as a continuation of her foreign policy efforts in shaping Minsk’s peacekeeping image and enhancing Belarus’ international weight. The Belarusian authorities are aware that their initiative is unlikely to find supporters among the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. In Russia, isolationist sentiments prevail.
In addition, for domestic audiences, the authorities make up for the lack of tangible economic growth with demonstrations of growth in Minsk’s authority at international level through providing a platform for religious, sportive and other dialogues.