Belarus may use ‘grey’ schemes to repay international public debt in 2015
Belarus anticipates refinancing almost one third of its international public debt to mature in 2015, announced Deputy Finance Minister Ermolovich on June 26th while talking about the prospects of repaying international and domestic debt in the coming year.
In particular, he noted that from the total USD 3 billion due for repayment, USD 2 billion will be repaid from the state budget and circa USD 1 billion will be refinanced from various sources. This implies that Belarus will receive USD 1.5 billion in additional revenues from the export duties on oil products and USD 500 million from elsewhere. Meanwhile, the draft budget for 2015 does not yet list the said amount in the budget revenues. Allegedly, Belarus expects to receive half a billion USD from the new ‘innovative schemes’, which have replaced the ‘lubricants and solvents schemes’ in 2014. If so, then Belarus’ main risk factor in receiving additional revenues would be Russia’s tax manoeuvres in the oil industry, which, depending on the chosen scheme, could substantially refine the size of benefits offered to Belarus.
Over the past year, military-political relations between Minsk and Kyiv have become complicated. Due to their high inertia and peculiarities, this downward trend would be extremely difficult to overcome.
The root cause of the crisis is the absence of a common political agenda in the Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. Minsk is looking for a market for Belarusian exports in Ukraine and offers its services as a negotiation platform for the settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian war, thereby hoping to avoid political issues in the dialogue with Kiev. Meanwhile, Ukraine is hoping for political support from Minsk in the confrontation with Moscow. In addition, Ukraine’s integration with NATO presupposes her common position with the Alliance in relation to Belarus. The NATO leadership regards the Belarusian Armed Forces as an integral part of the Russian military machine in the western strategic front (the Baltic states and Poland). In addition, the ongoing military reform in Ukraine envisages a reduction in the number of generals and the domestic political struggle makes some Ukrainian top military leaders targets in politically motivated attacks.
Hence, the criticism of Belarus coming from Ukrainian military leadership is dictated primarily by internal and external political considerations, as well as by the need to protect the interests of generals, and only then by facts.
For instance, initially, the Ukrainian military leadership made statements about 100,000 Russian servicemen allegedly taking part in the Russo-Belarusian military drill West-2017. Then the exercises were labelled quazi-open and military observers from Ukraine refused to provide their assessment, which caused a negative reaction in Minsk. Further, without citing specific facts, it was stated that Russia was building up its military presence in Belarus.
Apparently, the Belarusian and Ukrainian Defence Ministries have entangled in a confrontational spiral (on the level of rhetoric). Moreover, only a small part of the overly hidden process has been disclosed. That said, third states are very likely to take advantage of the situation (or have already done so). This is not only about Russia.
The Belarusian Defence Ministry officials are restrained in assessing their Ukrainian counterparts. However, such a restraint is not enough. Current military-political relations between Belarus and Ukraine are unlikely to stabilise without the intervention of both presidents.