Belarus may restrict imports of goods with Russian conformity certificates
As of February 2017, the Russian Federal Customs Service stopped accepting conformity certificates issued by Custom Union member states other than Russia at the Russian customs border. Such approach violates the principles of the EEU Treaty and its main goal is to ensure that the certification of all products coming to Russia is carried out only by Russian certification bodies and generates additional income for them. Due the new rules, Belarusian cargo transport companies are likely to reduce the volume of transit cargo shipments. There may be difficulties with certification of imported products supplied with Russian certificates. The terms for products certification may increase and there may be more cases when products with Russian certificates could be denied registration in Belarus. If the issue is not resolved in the near future, Belarus could introduce similar measures in response, which would lead to problems with supply of some goods and enhanced control over imports from Russia. In addition, Belarus could introduce administrative measures to perplex access of Russian products to the Belarusian market.
Over the past year, military-political relations between Minsk and Kyiv have become complicated. Due to their high inertia and peculiarities, this downward trend would be extremely difficult to overcome.
The root cause of the crisis is the absence of a common political agenda in the Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. Minsk is looking for a market for Belarusian exports in Ukraine and offers its services as a negotiation platform for the settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian war, thereby hoping to avoid political issues in the dialogue with Kiev. Meanwhile, Ukraine is hoping for political support from Minsk in the confrontation with Moscow. In addition, Ukraine’s integration with NATO presupposes her common position with the Alliance in relation to Belarus. The NATO leadership regards the Belarusian Armed Forces as an integral part of the Russian military machine in the western strategic front (the Baltic states and Poland). In addition, the ongoing military reform in Ukraine envisages a reduction in the number of generals and the domestic political struggle makes some Ukrainian top military leaders targets in politically motivated attacks.
Hence, the criticism of Belarus coming from Ukrainian military leadership is dictated primarily by internal and external political considerations, as well as by the need to protect the interests of generals, and only then by facts.
For instance, initially, the Ukrainian military leadership made statements about 100,000 Russian servicemen allegedly taking part in the Russo-Belarusian military drill West-2017. Then the exercises were labelled quazi-open and military observers from Ukraine refused to provide their assessment, which caused a negative reaction in Minsk. Further, without citing specific facts, it was stated that Russia was building up its military presence in Belarus.
Apparently, the Belarusian and Ukrainian Defence Ministries have entangled in a confrontational spiral (on the level of rhetoric). Moreover, only a small part of the overly hidden process has been disclosed. That said, third states are very likely to take advantage of the situation (or have already done so). This is not only about Russia.
The Belarusian Defence Ministry officials are restrained in assessing their Ukrainian counterparts. However, such a restraint is not enough. Current military-political relations between Belarus and Ukraine are unlikely to stabilise without the intervention of both presidents.