USD 90 billion for the rescue of Belarusian industry
To create 400,000 high-performance workplaces and their modernization the government needs to find USD 90 billion. However closer analysis of the adopted Industrial Development Programme suggests that this project will not be fully implemented due to insufficient funding and conflicting objectives and actions.
A Belarusian Industry Development Programme till 2020 has been approved by the Council of Ministers’ regulation No 622 on July 5th, 2012.
Funding is the core of any project. Appendix 4, Programme’s Funding Sources divides funding sources into 4 groups. Apparently, projected funding from the national budget, as well as from enterprises’ own funds is realistic, while projected foreign investment volumes are not achievable. For instance, it is planned to attract USD 3 billion of FDIs in 2012. During the first half of 2012, the National Statistics Committee data says, only USD 150 million of investment in fixed assets has been attracted. The planned merger within “Rosbelavto” holding will not achieve the projected figures either.
The Programme declares geographic and commodity diversification of exports. In 2011 34% of Belarus’ exports were to Russia. Simultaneously, the Programme’s very first paragraph speaks about the intensification of economic relations with Russia in order to maintain traditional markets.
Commodity diversification involves changes in the share of mineral products exports from 36% in 2011 to 21% in 2020 mainly due to the increase in the share of machinery equipment and vehicles exports. It is assumed that “Belarusian Autoworks” will increase its share in the global market by one third and the shares of harvesters sales in the global market will grow by 50%. Apparently, these calculations are based on hopes that the world’s producers will give up their market shares without opposition to Belarus.
Thus, the industrial development plan in question looks rather like a sci-fi story, not a real action plan and for this reason will not be implemented in full. At the same time, some parts of the plan could nevertheless be implemented.
The Belarusian authorities regard the Catholic conference as yet another international event to promote Minsk as a global negotiating platform. Minsk’s proposal to organise a meeting between the Roman-Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church is rather an image-making undertaking than a serious intention. However, the authorities could somewhat extend the opportunities for the Roman-Catholic Church in Belarus due to developing contacts with the Catholic world.
Minsk is attempting to lay out a mosaic from various international religious, political and sportive events to shape a positive image of Belarus for promoting the Helsinki 2.0 idea.
Belarus’ invitation to the head of the Holy See for a meeting with the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church should be regarded as a continuation of her foreign policy efforts in shaping Minsk’s peacekeeping image and enhancing Belarus’ international weight. The Belarusian authorities are aware that their initiative is unlikely to find supporters among the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. In Russia, isolationist sentiments prevail.
In addition, for domestic audiences, the authorities make up for the lack of tangible economic growth with demonstrations of growth in Minsk’s authority at international level through providing a platform for religious, sportive and other dialogues.