Inflation and prices

Category status:
April 22, 2016 17:54

On 28 May the retail price of vodka increased by 10%, sugar by 40%. As of 1st June the price of tobacco and alcohol will be increased by 30%.

On 24 May the Belneftekhim Concern increased the retail prices of petroleum products by an average of 20%. The cost of petrol A-95 was set to approx. USD 0.9. It is anticipated that in the near future petroleum prices will rise again.

On 25 May international railway fares were raised. On 26 May the margins of selling prices of beef and pork were increased.

The Ministry of Economy has acknowledged that during the past 5 months the inflation could exceed 15%. Following the devaluation, the Ministry of Economy recalculated the annual inflation at 55-75% however following discussions in the government the forecast was lowered to 33%.

Comment

The official devaluation resulted in even higher prices. The increase of pensions from 1 June (on average by 13.7%), and of salaries of public sector workers, drags the country deeper into a spiral of “wages – prices”.

The next step is raising fares on public transport, gas, electricity and heat, followed by a slight increase in wages in the public sector. All this will heat up the flywheel of inflation and become an additional factor of growing USD rates. At the same time, the country still lacks the political will to tighten the monetary and fiscal policy (freezing salaries, suspension of activities and bankruptcy of enterprises, etc.).

The government’s unwillingness to acknowledge the unpleasant data and the economic consequences speak of their “coward” attitude.

The government experts consider the possibility of a moratorium on the actual accession of Belarus to the single economic space on 1 July 2011 as one of the solutions to curb inflation. They explain that in the case of lifting of the restrictions on mutual trade with the Customs Union member countries locally produced goods, particularly goods of social significance with regulated prices, will be “washed out” from the Belarusian market by “dealers” and immigrants from the neighboring countries because of the sheer disparity of prices (also increased by the devaluation). Belarus will face a problem of shortages of essential products with all the potential social consequences. Another negative effect of lifting the restrictions on mutual trade with the CU countries is that it will expose Belarus to the flow of imports, which could have painful consequences for some Belarusian industries (light industry, food industry).

Therefore it is likely that Belarus introduces such moratorium however at the moment Russia has leverage to prevent it.

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Belarusian and Ukrainian Defence Ministries entangle in confrontation spiral
October 02, 2017 11:57
Фото: RFRM

Over the past year, military-political relations between Minsk and Kyiv have become complicated. Due to their high inertia and peculiarities, this downward trend would be extremely difficult to overcome.

The root cause of the crisis is the absence of a common political agenda in the Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. Minsk is looking for a market for Belarusian exports in Ukraine and offers its services as a negotiation platform for the settlement of the Russo-Ukrainian war, thereby hoping to avoid political issues in the dialogue with Kiev. Meanwhile, Ukraine is hoping for political support from Minsk in the confrontation with Moscow. In addition, Ukraine’s integration with NATO presupposes her common position with the Alliance in relation to Belarus. The NATO leadership regards the Belarusian Armed Forces as an integral part of the Russian military machine in the western strategic front (the Baltic states and Poland). In addition, the ongoing military reform in Ukraine envisages a reduction in the number of generals and the domestic political struggle makes some Ukrainian top military leaders targets in politically motivated attacks.

Hence, the criticism of Belarus coming from Ukrainian military leadership is dictated primarily by internal and external political considerations, as well as by the need to protect the interests of generals, and only then by facts.

For instance, initially, the Ukrainian military leadership made statements about 100,000 Russian servicemen allegedly taking part in the Russo-Belarusian military drill West-2017. Then the exercises were labelled quazi-open and military observers from Ukraine refused to provide their assessment, which caused a negative reaction in Minsk. Further, without citing specific facts, it was stated that Russia was building up its military presence in Belarus.

Apparently, the Belarusian and Ukrainian Defence Ministries have entangled in a confrontational spiral (on the level of rhetoric). Moreover, only a small part of the overly hidden process has been disclosed. That said, third states are very likely to take advantage of the situation (or have already done so). This is not only about Russia.

The Belarusian Defence Ministry officials are restrained in assessing their Ukrainian counterparts. However, such a restraint is not enough. Current military-political relations between Belarus and Ukraine are unlikely to stabilise without the intervention of both presidents.