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All trends

Security issues

CSTO Summit: Going Together, But in Different Directions

May 16 – May 22

Minsk toughens rhetoric as the West declines to engage in dialogue

May 9 – May 15

Minsk wants the Russian-Ukrainian war to end

May 2 – May 8

Minsk will continue to try to distance itself from Russia’s war against Ukraine

April 25 – May 1

Minsk tries to remain relevant to regional security geopolitics

April 18 – April 24

Minsk tries to return to “security arbitrage”

April 11 – April 17

Minsk wants out of this war

April 4 – April 10

Aggression against Ukraine: the situation for Minsk is becoming more complicated

March 28 – April 3

No signs of Belarus preparing for war

March 21 – March 27

Minsk tries to isolate itself from the war against Ukraine

March 14 – March 20

Minsk continues to balance on the brink of war and peace

March 7 – March 13

Minsk will shield the Kremlin from the West but has no interest in fighting in Ukraine

February 28 – March 6

The Belarusian regime buys a ticket aboard the “Titanic”

February 21 – February 27

Minsk sends conflicting signals about the expanding Russian military presence

February 14 – February 20

Belarusian-Ukrainian relations in free fall

February 7 – February 13

Belarusian-Ukrainian relations are steadily deteriorating

January 31 – February 6

Minsk-Kyiv: “Cold War” replaces “Cold Peace”

January 17 – January 23

Minsk demonstrates its inability to competently evaluate and respond to external challenges

January 10 – January 16

Minsk awaits the West’s response to the Kremlin’s ultimatum

December 20 – December 26

Minsk tries to get off the Russian escalation train

December 13 – December 19

A new wave of repression before the constitutional referendum

December 6 – December 12

Minsk abandons its longstanding positioning as “a regional security donor”

November 29 – December 5

“Pre-war” rhetoric as a tool of Minsk’s pressure on the EU

November 22 – November 28

The West has begun to speak a language that Minsk understands

November 15 – November 21

The Kremlin has its own agenda regarding the confrontation between the Belarusian regime and the West

November 8 – November 14

The Military Doctrine of the “Union State” and the Migration Crisis

November 1 – November 7

Minsk once again invokes the “Polish threat.”

October 25 – October 31

Lukashenka undermines COVID control measures as the leadership of the security forces is strengthened ahead of the referendum

October 18 – October 24

Afghanistan is not a Belarusian Problem

October 11 – October 17

The migration crisis escalates on both sides of the border

October 4 – October 10

The Belarusian regime opens a Ukrainian Front

September 27 – October 3

Mixed Messaging from Minsk

September 20 – September 26

The field of political decisions is sharply narrowing

September 13 – September 19

Minsk’s strategic autonomy diminishes

September 6 – September 12

The possibility of a Russian military base in Belarus returns to the agenda

August 30 – September 5

The Belarusian regime seeks to diversify conflict with the West

August 23 – August 29

Zapad [West] -2021 becomes Russian

August 16 – August 22